1.0 Executive Summary

This document outlines a phased technical response plan for the Qilin ransomware incident affecting your Cisco UCS C240 M5 servers, VMware ESXi hypervisors, and associated virtual machines (VMs). The primary objectives are to contain the threat, eradicate the adversary from the network, safely recover critical systems, and implement robust security controls to prevent recurrence. The report that your Veeam backup repository was also encrypted indicates a sophisticated attack involving lateral movement and privilege escalation. Adherence to this structured plan is critical to avoid reinfection and ensure a secure recovery.

Immediate Advisory: Do NOT pay the ransom. There is no guarantee that you will receive a functional decryption key. Paying the ransom funds criminal enterprises and marks your organization as a willing target for future attacks. Engage with law enforcement (e.g., FBI, CISA) and your cyber insurance provider immediately.

2.0 Phase 1: Containment and Assessment

This initial phase focuses on stopping the spread of the ransomware and preserving evidence for forensic analysis.

• 2.1 Network Isolation: Immediately isolate all affected systems.
  • Physical Disconnection: For the compromised UCS C240 M5 servers, disconnect their network interfaces (VICs) from the fabric interconnects or upstream switches.
  • Logical Segmentation: If physical disconnection is not immediately possible, use Access Control Lists (ACLs) on your switches or firewall rules on your Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) to create a “quarantine” VLAN. Block all inbound and outbound traffic to and from the infected server subnets, except for a dedicated, isolated forensic workstation.
  • Isolate Backup Infrastructure: The compromised Veeam server and its repository must also be taken offline to prevent further damage or attempts by the attacker to exfiltrate data.
• 2.2 Preserve Forensic Evidence: Do not wipe or reboot compromised systems indiscriminately. The attacker’s tools and methods have left traces.
  • Memory Capture: If any compromised systems (especially domain controllers or potential initial access points) are still running, perform a live memory (RAM) capture using tools like Volatility or Redline. This can contain encryption keys, passwords, and running processes.
  • Disk Imaging: Create bit-for-bit disk images of critical encrypted servers, including the Veeam server and a representative ESXi host’s boot disk. These images are crucial for a post-mortem forensic investigation to determine the initial attack vector and extent of the compromise.
• 2.3 Engage Cisco Support and Incident Response:
  • Cisco TAC: Open a Priority 1 (P1) case with Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) for your UCS and networking hardware. While TAC cannot perform decryption, they can assist with hardware diagnostics, firmware validation, and secure reconfiguration procedures during the recovery phase.
  • Cisco Talos Incident Response: We strongly recommend engaging a professional incident response team. Cisco Talos Incident Response specializes in these events and can assist with forensic analysis, threat actor attribution, and guided remediation.

3.0 Phase 2: Eradication and Secure Recovery

This phase involves building a new, clean environment and restoring data from trusted backups. Given that your primary backups are compromised, this will be the most challenging phase.

• 3.1 Identify a Trusted Recovery Source:

  • Search for Offline/Immutable Backups: Exhaust every possibility of finding an uncompromised backup. This includes:
    • Air-gapped Backups: LTO tapes stored offsite.
    • Immutable Cloud Storage: Backups sent to a cloud provider (e.g., Amazon S3, Azure Blob) with object lock or immutability enabled.
    • Offline Snapshots: Any storage array snapshots that were taken offline and are inaccessible from the production network.
  • Worst-Case Scenario: If no clean backups exist, you must prepare for a full rebuild of the environment from scratch, using golden images and whatever raw data can be salvaged.

• 3.2 Rebuild the Core Infrastructure: Do not restore onto a compromised foundation.

  • Active Directory (AD): If your domain controllers were VMs on the affected hosts, assume they are compromised. Rebuild AD from a known-good backup from before the suspected compromise date (which could be weeks or months ago). If no such backup exists, you must build a new forest. Crucially, reset ALL passwords in the domain, starting with Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (krbtgt) account (reset it twice), domain/enterprise admins, and service accounts.
  • Cisco UCS and VMware ESXi:
    1. Securely Re-Image ESXi: Do not trust the existing ESXi installations. Use the Cisco Custom Image for ESXi, downloaded directly from VMware’s website, to perform a clean installation on your C240 M5 servers.
    2. Update Firmware: Use Cisco Intersight or UCS Manager to update all server firmware (BIOS, CIMC, VIC, RAID controllers) to the latest recommended versions to patch any known vulnerabilities.
    3. Harden ESXi: Change the ESXi root password, disable unnecessary services (e.g., SSH, ESXi Shell) unless actively needed, and configure the ESXi firewall.

• 3.3 Systematic Restoration and Validation:

  • Restore systems in a phased approach within a new, clean, and isolated network segment.
  • Order of Operations:
    1. Core Services: Domain Controllers, DNS, DHCP.
    2. Security and Management Tools.
    3. Business-Critical Application and Database Servers.
  • Scan Before Reconnecting: Before migrating any restored VM into the production network, ensure it is fully patched and thoroughly scanned with an updated Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solution, such as Cisco Secure Endpoint. This ensures you are not reintroducing malware from a compromised backup.

4.0 Phase 3: Post-Incident Hardening and Prevention

Use the lessons from this attack to build a more resilient infrastructure.

• 4.1 Implement the 3-2-1-1-0 Backup Rule:
  • 3 copies of your data.
  • 2 different media types.
  • 1 copy offsite.
  • 1 copy offline/air-gapped or immutable.
  • 0 errors after recovery verification (perform regular restore tests).
• 4.2 Network Segmentation and Zero Trust:
  • Use your networking infrastructure (Cisco Firepower, Catalyst, or ACI) to create strict segmentation. The backup network should be on a highly restricted VLAN with ACLs that only allow communication from specific backup components on specific ports. Production servers should not be able to directly access the backup repository’s management interface.
• 4.3 Identity and Access Management (IAM):
  • Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) using a solution like Cisco Duo for ALL administrative access, including vCenter, ESXi, UCS Manager, CIMC, remote desktop (RDP), and VPN.
  • Implement the Principle of Least Privilege. No user or service account should have more permissions than absolutely necessary.
• 4.4 Advanced Threat Detection:
  • Deploy Cisco Secure Endpoint on all servers and endpoints to detect and block malware based on behavior, not just signatures.
  • Utilize Cisco Secure Network Analytics (Stealthwatch) to monitor east-west traffic within your data center. It can detect anomalous behavior, such as a server attempting to scan the network or access a backup repository, which is indicative of lateral movement by an attacker.
• 4.5 Patch Management: Maintain a rigorous patch management schedule for all systems: operating systems, hypervisors, applications, and Cisco UCS firmware. Utilize Cisco Intersight for simplified and centralized firmware management.

By following this structured approach, you can navigate this crisis, restore your operations on a secure foundation, and significantly improve your security posture against future attacks.